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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the ways in which the structure of the private owner-
ship of property affects the operation of land and housing markets. It draws
on detailed Land Registry data to identify the types of actors found at the
top of the property wealth distribution in Dudelange, Luxembourg, and to
gauge their respective influence on the production of the residential environ-
ment. While the top tail is made up of property developers, landowners and
super-landlords, an analysis of the planning and land assembly processes for
six large scale residential developments in the city since the 1970s shows
that the production of housing is driven by a small group of tightly intercon-
nected private landowners and property developers. The level of property
wealth concentration in a given territory is thus not innocuous – it affects the
production of the residential environment, especially when multiple property
ownership is interlinked with the concentrated control over residential land.
The study complements discussions on the relation between property, wealth
and the production of housing that focus on homeowners, small-scale private
landlords and the super-rich (on the consumption side) and, on the produc-
tion side, on selected actors such as financialised property developers and
public landowners.
KEYWORDS Housing; wealth; property ownership; property development; land ownership;
landlordism
Introduction
This article is an exploratory investigation of the influence of top property
owners on the land and housing markets in the context of the re-concen-
tration of (property) wealth (Piketty, 2014). It focuses on the case of
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Luxembourg, a country with very low property taxes, no inheritance tax on
transfers in direct line and which has experienced rapid house and land price
increases over the last decades (BCL, 2015; ODH, 2019a). Drawing on an arch-
ive of property transactions for the municipality of Dudelange since 1949 pro-
vided by the Land Registry, this study aims to complement the existing
literature on the relation between housing and wealth by shifting the focus
of analysis away from the ‘wealth middle classes’ to which property wealth is
usually attached. The notion of the ‘wealth middle class’ (Piketty & Saez, 2014,
p. 839) captures the major innovation of the 20th century as concerns the dis-
tribution of wealth: it was the first time that the middle classes had been able
to accumulate wealth holdings, mostly in the form of the ownership of the
household’s main residence. As other papers in this special issue demonstrate,
belonging to the wealth middle class increasingly also involves the ownership
of additional homes, i.e., the appropriation of multiple property ownership.
However, instead of a focus on the wealth middle class, this article is
concerned with the ways in which the structure of the private ownership of
property in a particular territory – and particularly the percentage of total
property wealth held by the top percentiles of owners – affects the oper-
ation of land and housing markets. In examining multiple property owner-
ship, the article thus shifts from the middle to the top tail of the property
wealth distribution. It shows how multiple property ownership – when it
involves the control over residential land – becomes a central force in the
production of the residential environment. This will be shown by mobilising
Land Registry data on the property holdings of private actors at the top of
the local property wealth hierarchy to track the ways in which they have
been involved in the production of the residential environment. In relation
to the literature on the links between property wealth and the operation of
land and housing markets, this can usefully complement consumption side
studies focused on owner occupiers and, more recently, on small-scale
landlords and the transnational wealth elite and start to broaden out pro-
duction side studies that have so far centred on the financialisation of prop-
erty development and on the actions of public landowners.
The article first sets the scene by providing a discussion of the ways in
which the links between property, wealth and the production of housing
have been studied in the literature. The focus then moves to a short pres-
entation of the Luxembourgish context and of the case study area: a former
industrial town in the relatively deprived South which has seen a recent
resurgence. This is followed by the analysis of the relative importance of
the three types of actors that make up the top tail of the property wealth
distribution in Dudelange: property developers, landowners and super-land-
lords. As described in a later section, all of these actors have estimated
property wealth holdings of over 3 million euros. What distinguishes them
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is their involvement in the development of houses and apartment buildings
(property developers) and the type of property good that makes up the major-
ity of the estimated value of their holdings: houses and apartments (super-
landlords) or land (landowners). These types of actors emerged from an
exploratory analysis in a particular city, but seem to converge with the catego-
ries mobilised in the literature. Drawing on an analysis of the role of these
actors in the planning and land assembly for six large scale residential devel-
opments in Dudelange since the 1970s, the article then identifies a small set of
tightly connected landowners and property developers at the very top of the
property wealth distribution who have been able to expand their property
wealth through the control of the production of the residential environment.
Property, wealth and the production of housing
The top of the property wealth distribution is at the cross-roads of a num-
ber of disciplinary debates. In work on wealth inequality, Piketty (2014) has
developed an account in which the development of wealth inequalities
focuses on macro-economic drivers and is synthesised by the r> g inequal-
ity: wealth inequality tends to increase whenever the return on capital r
(linked to the level of taxation) is greater than the rate of growth (of popu-
lation and productivity) g. His account draws on the existence of unequal
rates of return on wealth between the average wealth holder and those at
the top of the wealth hierarchy. This difference in rates of return is linked
to different wealth portfolio compositions, with property wealth (under-
stood as the ownership of the household’s main residence) found to be the
major source of wealth for the majority of the population, what has been
called the ‘wealth middle class’ (Piketty & Saez, 2014).
Research on housing and wealth has followed this identification of hous-
ing as middle class wealth, with attention focused on three broad issues.
The first is on the role of housing inheritance, and of its uneven geograph-
ical distribution, for wealth distribution (Forrest & Murie, 1989; Hamnett,
1992), with recent studies highlighting the importance of parental back-
ground for purchases in expensive housing markets (Coulter, 2017;
Hochstenbach, 2018). The second concerns the implications of changing
homeownership rates for the evolution of wealth inequality (Hamnett,
1991; Thorns, 1989). Recent studies have highlighted the way in which this
can be mediated by the different housing regimes in Europe (Wind, Lersch,
& Dewilde, 2017) or how rising homeownership affects the spatial distribu-
tion of wealth in Canadian cities (Walks, 2016). The third focus is the way in
which geography intersects with housing wealth. It has been shown that
the value of a property is inseparable from the neighbourhood in which
the property is located (Forrest & Murie, 1989) and that it also depends on
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the way in which the area, and the wider territory it is a part of, changes
(Badcock, 1994). It has been shown for owner-occupation that gains associ-
ated with property ownership are not equal across a territory (Kim, 2003;
Murie, 1991; Thomas & Dorling, 2004) and that higher socio-economic
groups are better able to take advantage of these differentials (Burbidge,
2000; Hamnett, 1999; Wind & Hedman, 2018).
Recent studies have taken stock of the re-concentration of property
wealth within the ‘wealth middle classes’ and have centred their analyses
on the return of small-scale landlordism. Ronald and Kadi (2018) provide a
detailed analysis of the rise of private landlords that underlies the recent
return of private renting in the UK. While this is undoubtedly a develop-
ment with broad implications – such as the rise of buy-to-let gentrification
(Paccoud, 2017), it is driven by small-scale landlords who own one or two
properties as letting investments. Arundel (2017), drawing on the Wealth
and Assets Survey, finds that these landlords are overwhelmingly found in
the top housing wealth deciles. This provides some justification for the dis-
tinction operated in the analysis below between super-landlords (those at
the top of the property wealth distribution) and small-scale landlords.
There are, however, elements in the literature which point to the import-
ance of investigating top property wealth holders in their own right.
Benton, Keister, and Lee (2017), in the most detailed description of the top
owners of real estate wealth to date (based on the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) in the United States) report very little overlap between the
top real estate owners and the households with the highest net worth
(Benton et al., 2017: 59). Second, the variables that explain the possession
of real estate wealth for the survey population as a whole (receiving an
inheritance, being highly educated, being white, etc.) are not found to be
significant in explaining a household’s situation in the top 1% of real estate
holders (Benton et al., 2017: 60).
A strand of research which sheds some light on the actors at the top of
the property wealth distribution is the work that seeks to understand the
real estate investments of the super-rich, pushed forward by Beaverstock,
Hubbard, and Short (2004) and Hay and Muller (2012). Focusing on London,
Atkinson, Burrows, and Rhodes (2016) show how the city has become a
magnet for residential investments by this population and chart the impli-
cations of the internationalisation of the property market that follows. Paris
(2017) provides details on the transnational residential investment strat-
egies of the super-rich through the case of Asian investments in Australia.
There have been some attempts to link these transnational investments
into real estate to the literature on the financialisation of housing. For
example, Fernandez, Hofman, and Aalbers (2016) show that particular cities
such as New York and London have become ‘safe deposit boxes’ for the
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transnational wealth elite linked to the growing ‘wall of money’ searching
for investment opportunities (van Loon & Aalbers, 2017). These new devel-
opments indicate that the consumption of housing is no longer limited to
the wealth middle class.
What unites all of the research at the intersection of housing and wealth
presented thus far is that it is primarily concerned with the consumption of
housing and its unequal distribution. The analyses in this paper are an
attempt to push the discussion towards the ways in which the structure of
the ownership of property in a given territory shapes the production of the
residential environment. As concerns the production of the residential
environment, there seem to be two main lines of engagement: the financi-
alisation of property development and the actions of public landowners.
Examples of work on property developers include Pollard (2009) that com-
pares the development of housing production systems in France and Spain,
van Loon (2016) that contrasts the financialisation of real estate develop-
ment in the Netherlands to the ‘patient capital’ approach of Belgian devel-
opers and Romainville (2017), who provides a detailed study of the ways in
which capital from other economic spheres enters the housing market
through property development in Brussels. Other studies focus on the ways
in which financialisation shapes the production of the built environment:
Guironnet, Attuyer, and Halbert (2016) show how the expectations of
investors for a large-scale redevelopment scheme constrained the local
authority in its strategic plans for the area; Sanfelici and Halbert (2016) pro-
vide an account of the way in which the relation between investors and
property developers in Brazil shapes the production of housing.
The second line of research into the production of the residential envir-
onment concerns the actions of usually large public landowners, pushed
forward by Christophers’ (2016) work on the political economy of land. This
work shows the significant effects of the privatisation of public land on the
type of housing produced: Hy€otyl€ainen and Haila (2018) show how the sale
of public land to an investment company led to the development of an
‘island of extreme wealth’, and Adisson and Artioli (2019) show how differ-
ent institutional arrangements shape the on-the-ground results of the sale
of land by public landowners in France and Italy. This research strand is
also concerned with the other ways in which public landowners can influ-
ence the housing and commercial markets. For example, Christophers
(2019) describes the strategies used by austerity-squeezed local authorities
in England to mobilise property development and ownership to maintain
essential services.
This paper fills a research gap by focusing on the influence of a variety
of private actors at the top of the property wealth distribution on the pro-
duction of the residential environment. This can usefully complement the
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work described above which discusses the changing distribution of housing
consumption within the ‘wealth middle classes’ and the housing consump-
tion behaviours of the super-rich linked to the of ‘wall of money’ flowing
into real estate. It is also an attempt to broaden out discussions on the
actors involved in the production of the residential environment, which has
so far focused on financialised private developers and public landowners.
This will be done by presenting the structure of private property ownership
in Dudelange, identifying the three types of private actors present at the
top of the property wealth distribution – property developers, landowners
and super-landlords – and by gauging the influence of these top property
owners on six large scale residential projects that took place in the city
since the end of the 1970s. The literature presented above provides some
indication that the actors identified through an exploratory analysis of the
top of Dudelange’s property wealth distribution are in line with the actors
studied in the broad housing and wealth literature.
The structure of property ownership in Dudelange
Presentation of Luxembourg and Dudelange
Luxembourg is a particularly interesting case for investigating property
wealth inequality and top property wealth owners. While 69% of house-
holds own the property in which they live, there are significant disparities
in property prices across the country’s territory (ODH, 2016) and socio-spa-
tial differentiation is marked (ODS, 2013). There are also large inequalities
regarding multiple property ownership (Osier, 2011; Ziegelmeyer, 2015). For
example, drawing on HFCS data, Ziegelmeyer (2015: 17) reports that the
share of rental income from multiple property ownership is just over 10%
in the fifth quintile of wealth owners, while it is at 1.1% for the fourth and
well below 1% for the first three quintiles. These inequalities have devel-
oped in a context in which house prices have increased by close to a factor
of 3.5 between 1995 and 2014, just behind the UK and Sweden (BCL, 2015,
p. 112). The data in Cowell, Nolan, Olivera, and Van Kerm (2017) show that
in Luxembourg property represents a similar share of net worth at both the
aggregate level and for the 5% wealthiest in their sample (85% and 84%,
respectively). This is in contrast to drops of at least 10 percentage points
when moving from the aggregate to the top 5% level in this share for the
other seven OECD countries studied. The general tendency for the very
wealthy to shift investments away from property (Piketty, 2014) seems not
to hold in Luxembourg.
The city of Dudelange (20,851 inhabitants in 2018), located on the
French border in the South of the country, is the birthplace of
Luxembourg’s modern steel industry. It covers just over 21 km2, of which
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approximately 7.5 km2 are currently built-up, with the remaining area split
between woods and agricultural land. The majority of its residents (73.2%)
owned their own home in the 2011 Population Census and property prices
and rent levels are slightly below the national average. The population
stagnated until the 1990s as the industrial based slowly withered away and
the city has since gained over 6000 inhabitants. This recent growth is due
to its close proximity to the capital city and its still relatively affordable
property prices. This new population is mostly accommodated in new
houses and apartments at the periphery of the existing urban fabric.
The next section presents the data source used and provides a snapshot
of the broad structure of property ownership in Dudelange.
The structure of property ownership in Dudelange
The analyses described in this article rely on information on property
transfers drawn from notarial statements kept in the Luxembourg Land
Registry’s archives.1 These notarial statements are automatically sent by
notaries to the Land Registry to allow it to update its records on the owner-
ship of land plots. These data provide information on the property goods
themselves (type, size, location) as well as on their owner(s). In the cases
in which a land plot or an apartment has more than one owner, the data
distinguishes between four types of co-ownership: a married couple,
a couple in a civil union,2 a group of heirs3 and voluntary co-ownership.4
This archival resource makes it possible to obtain a picture of the current
day structure of ownership in Dudelange, as well to identify the mecha-
nisms that have produced this structure.
In this study, the focus is on six types of property goods that are pre-
dominantly in private hands in Luxembourg: houses, apartments, residential
land, other types of land, commercial buildings and other types of buildings
(agricultural, industrial, etc.). This thus excludes transport, water and energy
infrastructure, public buildings and green spaces, as well as forests (in large
proportion nationally owned). The distinction between residential and other
types of land is critical given the extreme difference in value between resi-
dential and other uses of land: for example, while a hectare of arable land
in Luxembourg sold for an average of 35,590 euros in 2017 (Luxembourg
Statistical Office), the average value of a hectare of residential land in the
country between 2010 and 2017 was 6,874,200 euros (ODH, 2019a).
In Dudelange, there are currently 57 hectares of residential land and 563
hectares of other land (agricultural, commercial and industrial), distin-
guished on the basis of the latest municipal zoning map. There are also
4534 houses, approximately 3700 apartments5 and 167 buildings that are
neither residential nor administrative in purpose.
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These properties are owned by 10,145 entities (counting all individuals
and companies listed as owners) and 7231 entities if only the first listed
owner is chosen (in the cases in which property is owned by more than
person). This latter figure is a better representation of the number of
unique owners, given that co-owners tend to be spouses or co-inheritors.
To gain a more detailed picture of the structure of the ownership of prop-
erty goods, estimates of property wealth shares have been computed. The
figures are estimates because not all property transactions in the Land
Registry archive feature a value for the property goods listed (such as in the
case of inheritances). Two procedures have been used. The 2017 average
price per m2 for the city of Dudelange drawn from Housing Observatory
data was used to estimate the value of apartments. The value of residential
land was estimated from the 2010 to 2014 average for the city as a whole,
again drawing on Housing Observatory data. There is no precise informa-
tion available on the value of land zoned as agricultural, commercial or
industrial in Dudelange or in the south of the country. To estimate the
value of non-residential land in private hands, I have decided to assign it a
tenth of the value of residential land in Dudelange. This choice can be justi-
fied by the municipality’s modest size in a densely populated region (which
means most of its land could one day be allocated to residential develop-
ment). For houses and the other types of buildings, I have taken into
account both the size of the building’s footprint6 and the amount of empty
land in the remainder of the land plot (valued at half the price of residential
land given the greater difficulty with which it can be mobilised for housing
development). It is likely that these figures underestimate the actual con-
centration of property wealth as wealthier owners tend to own better qual-
ity property in more expensive areas. These estimates should not be
directly compared to the wealth shares emerging from wealth surveys
because they only measure the concentration of property among the own-
ers listed for them (and thus not for the whole population of the area) and
include both private persons and corporate actors. While imperfect, these
estimates of the value of the six types of properties provide a first picture
of the way in which the private ownership of a territory is structured.
Focusing on the first owners of the land plots concerned, the top 1% of
property owners (that is the 72 individuals and companies in Dudelange with
the most property wealth in the area) are estimated to own 17.9% of the
property wealth in the area, the top 10% (723 entities) own roughly 36.5%
and the top 20% (1446 entities in Dudelange) own roughly 48.6% of the
municipality’s property wealth (see Table 1 below). This high level of inequal-
ity, and especially at the very top, is driven by the high degree of concentra-
tion of residential land in Dudelange and across Luxembourg as a whole.
Indeed, a distinction needs to be made between the levels of concentration in
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residential property and in residential land. In the European Central Bank’s
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), the top 1% of owners
held 5% of the value of all Household Main Residences in the country. This
contrasts with the results of a recent study that has shown that among the
15,907 private individuals who owned residential land in Luxembourg, the top
1% concentrated 25.1% of this land by value (ODH, 2019b). This degree of
concentration is even higher among private companies: the 8 companies with
the most valuable residential land holdings (the top 1%) concentrated 41.7%
of the value of the residential land owned by companies (ODH, 2019b). This
distinction between the level of concentration in residential property and in
residential land is reflected in the estimates produced here for Dudelange (see
Table 1 above). The high level of inequality is driven primarily by the owner-
ship of land plots (including here land as well as houses and the gardens that
surround them), with the ownership of apartments showing a much smaller
degree of concentration. The estimates computed for Dudelange are thus in
line with those of the HFCS and the Housing Observatory.
Top property owners and the production of the residential
environment
To move from the structure of the ownership of property to the way in which
this structure affects the production of the residential environment, it is neces-
sary to better grasp the number of unique decision makers operating in a
given housing and land market. This means shifting from the individual level
(individual or company) to the group level (family, conglomerate or a mix of
the two) at which decisions related to property are taken. This is linked to the
movement towards the re-familialisation of housing and welfare (Flynn &
Schwartz, 2017; Ronald & Kadi, 2018), the fact that property developers in
Luxembourg tend to create new companies for each of their projects and the
fact that property can be owned both in one’s own name and through a com-
pany. As shown in Figure 1 below, groups are created by: 1. linking individuals
based on the co-ownership of property goods in cases where this co-owner-
ship stems from a marriage, a civil union or the receipt of an inheritance
(Group X in Figure 1); 2. grouping companies together on the basis of the
Table 1. The structure of property ownership in current day Dudelange.
Number of
(first listed)
property owners
Share of the top
1% of (first listed)
property owners
Share of the top
10% of (first listed)
property owners
Share of the top
20% of (first listed)
property owners
Property wealth
in apartments
3003 5.7 24.1 37.9
Property wealth in
land plots
4562 21.6 39.2 50.2
All property wealth 7231 17.9 36.5 48.6
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founders and major shareholders listed in their articles of association7 (Group
Y in Figure 1); and 3. by mixing both individual and company links (Group Z in
Figure 1).
Given the article’s focus on the influence of top property owners on the
land and housing markets, I started at the top of the property wealth distri-
bution and worked my way down until the property holdings of individual
owners hit a threshold roughly equivalent to the ownership of 3 million
Euros in estimated property wealth. When I encountered an individual,
I searched all of the properties it owned in Dudelange for cases of
co-ownership and picked up connected individuals from further down in
the property wealth distribution to add to its group. In the case of compa-
nies, I extracted the founders and major shareholders and searched for
them among the Dudelange property owners. Groups thus contain at least
one individual or company at the very top of the property wealth distribu-
tion as well as other individuals and/or companies they are connected to
located anywhere in the distribution.8 Following this method, 258 individu-
als and companies (3.6% of all first listed owners) were assembled into the
top 105 groups representing 22.8% of all of the estimated property wealth
in the area (8% of apartment-based wealth and 28.8% of house and land
plot based wealth).9 The average property wealth of these 105 groups is 13
million Euros, ranging from 3 to 175 million Euros. The next section
describes the three actors identified among these top property owning
groups in Dudelange, followed by a detailed account of their respective
roles in the production of the city’s residential environment.
Property developers, landowners and super-landlords
Based on the types of real estate property owned and the extent of their
role in the production of housing, the 105 top property-owning groups in
Dudelange were allocated to one of three categories. The most important
criteria used to allocate a group to a category is whether the group can be
considered to be a property developer. Property developers include all top
Group (family) X Group (corporate) Y Group (Mixed) Z
A B
C D E
Co-owners:
married
Co-inheritors
Co-owners:
civil union
21
3
Founders: a,b
Shareholders: a, b,c Founders: a,b
Shareholders: a, b
Founders: a,b
Shareholders: b, c
Founders: a,c
Shareholders: a, d
Founder: d
Shareholders: a, b, c
4
5
F
H
G 6
Co-owners:
married Founder
7
Co-inheritor Major 
Shareholder
Figure 1. An illustration of the three types of groups assembled for the analysis of
top property owners.
10 A. PACCOUD
property owners which are involved in the development of individual
houses or apartment buildings. They can be identified through information
on the former owners of land plots, houses and apartments. A property
owner is categorised as a property developer if it is both the final owner of
the land plot on which the new project stands and the first seller of the
product developed. This is relatively straightforward for the development of
individual houses given that there is only one trail of transactions to follow.
An illustration of this is shown in the top row of Figure 2 above: group a
can be identified as a property owner because it owned the land on which
houses were built and is also the actor selling these houses. The situation is
more complex for apartment buildings. In this latter case, the purchase of
the land and the sale of completed apartments follow two distinct transac-
tion trails. A group can be identified as a developer when it is listed as both
the last owner of the land plot on which the building sits and as the first
seller of the new building’s apartments (as shown in the second row of
Figure 2). It is also identified as such when it was listed as the first owner
of all of the apartments in a particular building10 (as shown in the last row
of Figure 2).
If a group cannot be considered as a property developer, it is allocated
either to the ‘landowner’ or to the ‘super-landlord’ category on the basis of
the composition of its property wealth portfolio: for landowners, residential
land and other types of land make up the majority of the estimated value
of its property holdings; super-landlords, on the other hand, own mostly
housing (houses within small land plots and apartments) and other types
of buildings.
This classification of top property owners is a first, exploratory, attempt
to draw on the detailed information available in the Luxembourg Land
Figure 2. An illustration of the transactions associated with property development.
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Registry to build a picture of property ownership that brings together both
private persons and corporate actors. It focuses on two aspects of property
ownership: 1. The degree of involvement of a property owner in the pro-
duction of the residential environment and 2. The composition of the own-
er’s property portfolio, with a particular emphasis on the distinction
between land and housing. This is a first proposition in the absence of
detailed analyses of property ownership information drawn from the Land
Registry in other contexts.
As shown in Table 2 above, 26 of the 105 top property-owning groups
in Dudelange have been found to be associated with property develop-
ment. They account for just under a third of the property wealth in the
hands of these groups but have the most valuable property portfolios.
Dudelange’s recent resurgence linked to its relative proximity to the capital
city and its still relatively affordable real estate has mostly been accompa-
nied by the construction of individual houses on former agricultural land.
This can explain why it has received limited attention from national-level
property developers: while five of these were active in Dudelange, only
three had a significant stake in local property wealth (over 10 million euros
worth of property).
Landowners are the most numerous among the 105 top property-own-
ing groups in Dudelange and they account for 56.9% of the property
wealth of these groups. There are three types of landowners among the 49
identified. First, companies that need land for their non-real-estate opera-
tions (4 groups – including the top property owner by value), second,
investment funds in land (1 group) and third, private individuals or groups
thereof (44 groups). The ownership of land in Dudelange is thus predomin-
antly in the hands of private individuals and the origin of this land seems
to be primarily from farming operations. Residential land prices have been
increasing very rapidly in Luxembourg for the last decades (ODH, 2019a)
and there is thus little incentive for landowners to sell their land in a con-
text in which property taxes are extremely low and there is no inheritance
tax for transfers between spouses or between parents and their children.
This makes it very difficult for investment firms (and property developers)
from outside of the area to acquire land.
Table 2. The three types of groups at the top of Dudelange’s property wealth
distribution.
Number
Share of property
wealth among
top 105 groups
Share of property
wealth among all
private owners
in Dudelange
Average estimated
property wealth in
Dudelange (millions
of Euros)
Property developers 26 33.1% 7.6% 17.4
Landowners 49 56.9% 13% 15.9
Super-landlords 30 10% 2.3% 4.5
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The 30 super-landlords in Dudelange own just 10% of the estimated
property wealth of the 105 top property-owning groups and the average
value of their property portfolios is less than a third of that of property
developers and landowners. It is informative to contrast the weight of these
super-landlords to that of the small-scale landlords operating in the case
study area. Small-scale landlords are those who own more than one
apartment or house but who have less than 3 million euros in estimated
property wealth. There are 628 of these small-scale landlords in Dudelange
and they account for 14.7% of the total estimated property wealth in
the area – as compared to 2.3% for the 30 super-landlords. On average,
super-landlords have three times the property wealth of small scale
landlords. The majority of the estimated property wealth held by landlords is
thus in the hands of individuals with relatively few housing goods. This mir-
rors the trend of rising small scale landlordism in the UK context (Ronald &
Kadi, 2018), but is also a reflection of the fact that the most important actors
at the top of property wealth distribution, rather than landlords, are those
which are able to mobilise capital, land or both to control the type and
location of housing developed. This process is the focus of the next section.
Planning and land assembly: top property owners and the
production of the residential environment in Dudelange
The aim of this section is to move beyond the static picture of top property
wealth and to present some of the mechanisms through which the
structure of the ownership of property wealth affects the production of the
residential environment. It draws on an analysis of the process through
which planning permission was obtained and land was assembled in the six
largest property development schemes in Dudelange since the end of the
1970s. Given the size of these developments (between 4 and 16 hectares),
they required planning permission to be developed even though the land
they mobilised had already been zoned as residential. The planning applica-
tions for these developments were obtained from the archives of the
Interior Ministry in Luxembourg. These planning applications were studied
alongside the Land Registry archives that show the process through which
the land required for these schemes was assembled. This analysis reveals at
the same time a degree of diversity in the processes through which these
developments emerged from the ground and a striking overlap in the
actors (both property developers and landowners) involved.
There are three main configurations through which planning and land
assembly for large-scale residential developments was secured. The most
common (found in five of the six developments) takes the form of a planning
request by a large landowner for the land it owns. This entails receiving
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permission to slice up land into small land plots that can then be sold at a
premium to developers. All five of the landowners who adopted this strategy
can be linked to groups at the top of the property wealth hierarchy (groups
number 2, 3, 47, 53 and 62 by total estimated property wealth). Group num-
ber 3 sold land in this way in two separate developments. The fact that these
landowners are among the top property owners in Dudelange today after
having sold off large tracts of land provides some indication that they are
releasing land holdings progressively as part of a property wealth accumula-
tion strategy that is deployed across multiple generations. It is also striking
that landowners have been so active in drawing on the planning apparatus
to maximise the value of the land they do decide to sell off.
The second configuration corresponds to the four cases in which property
developers have led both the land assembly and planning permission processes.
Three property developers have been involved here. Two areas were assembled
and planned by a local property developer (group number 85 in the property
wealth hierarchy), purchasing once from group number 2 in the property wealth
hierarchy and once from group 53. The other two areas were assembled and
planned by national-level property developers. Both are still active and have
significant operations in Dudelange (groups number 4 and 23 in the property
wealth hierarchy). Group 23 purchased land from a landowner not among the
top 105 groups, while group 4 acquired the land from groups number 30, 47
and two other landowners not among the top 105 groups at the top of the
property wealth hierarchy.
The third configuration was identified in two areas only and gives
insights into the relations between property developers and landowners in
the production of the residential environment. In one case, a local property
developer (group number 51 in the property wealth hierarchy) applied for
an alteration of the planning permission granted to the landowner he then
purchased land from. This was beneficial to the landowner (group 62)
because the land was only purchased after the planning permission had
been modified. In the other case, 16 landowners sold land to a single local
property developer who then applied for planning permission, cut up the
total land area in building plots and sold back a portion of these plots to
each of the 16 landowners for exactly the same amount he had bought the
original land from them for. This was clearly an operation that was coordi-
nated to profit both the property developer and each landowner: through
the operation, the property developer (group 85 in the property wealth
distribution) secured building plots for itself at the cost of the planning
application only; the landowners received less land back than what they
had originally sold, but this land was now in the form of building plots that
could be sold on at higher value or developed. Among the 16 landowners
involved in this deal, 10 are amongst the top 105 property owners
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in Dudelange (groups: 2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 38, 39, 51, 53 and 85 – the developer
also owned land in the area).
These three configurations are a first attempt at capturing the ways in
which the groups at the top of the property wealth hierarchy extract value
from the production of the residential environment homeowners and land-
lords of all sizes consume. Looking at the production of the residential
environment in this way reveals how few actors are involved. Group 2 is for
example found in all three configurations: it requested planning permission
before selling off its land, sold land to a developer who had gained plan-
ning permission and was one of the 16 landowners who agreed to a mutu-
ally beneficial deal with a property developer. There are however more
links to be drawn here as the developer group 2 sold land to in the second
configuration (group 85) is also the developer that led the mutually benefi-
cial deal. Another landowner (group 53) – also found in all three configura-
tions – is in a similar position vis-a-vis group 85: it sold land to group 85
and was involved in group 85’s deal with landowners. A crude way to sum-
marise these links is to say that among the 16 groups at the top of the
property wealth hierarchy involved in these 6 large-scale housing develop-
ments, two were found to be active in all three configurations (2 and 53),
four were found to be active in two (47, 51, 62 and 85), with the other 10
only active in one of the three configurations. This exploratory analysis thus
reveals not only that a small number of actors at the top of the property
wealth hierarchy have an overwhelming influence on the production of
housing, but also that there are multiple links to be drawn between these
actors across large scale developments launched at different times and in
different areas of the city. This analysis also provides a glimpse of the shift-
ing boundaries between landowner and property developer: many of the
large landowners involved in these schemes have since taken on property
development projects (such as groups 2, 3 and 11). Thus, while property
developers and landowners are estimated to own just over a fifth of prop-
erty wealth in Dudelange, these 75 groups at the top of the property
wealth distribution are in a privileged position to control the production of
the residential environment.
Conclusion
This article is an exploratory investigation of the influence on the housing
and land markets of the property owners at the top of the private property
wealth distribution in Dudelange, drawing on archival material from the
Land Registry. The property wealth estimates developed in this study aim
to capture the orders of magnitude involved and make possible two contri-
butions to the study of property wealth.
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First, it studies top property ownership at the ‘group’ scale, be it the fam-
ily, the corporate group or a blend thereof. The family unit of analysis
brings into light the intergenerational transmission of property wealth as
the wealth accumulated through property development or the mobilisation
of land provides an advantage to the next generation, regardless of its
involvement in these processes. This can be seen in the fact that a number
of top property holdings have been constituted through the strategic man-
agement of land reserves across generations. Moving from the level of the
individual company to that of the corporate group provides a means to
piece together activities and schemes which seemed separate and to gain a
better understanding of the influence of these real estate interests on the
housing market.
Second, this study is a first proposition of a method to classify top prop-
erty owners according to their degree of involvement in the production of
the residential environment and the composition of their property wealth
portfolios. While comparative work is needed to test the generalisability of
the property wealth shares found in Dudelange for property developers,
landowners and super-landlords, it seems likely that these three types of
actors will also be found in other types of areas. These shares might fluctu-
ate according to the degree of openness of the area to global capital flows
into real estate – the Dudelange case, with the strong grip exercised by
local landowners on residential land clearly represents only one possible
configuration.
In summary, the analysis revealed the central importance of a small set
of tightly interconnected landowners and property developers in the
Dudelange land and housing markets. This result justifies the focus on the
role of private actors at the top of property wealth distribution rather than
on the changing distribution of housing within the ‘wealth middle classes’ or
the changing housing consumption behaviours of the super-rich: in
Dudelange, landlords of all sizes have little say over the production of the
residential environment. In complement to the work on the financialisation
of property development, the results also show that the property developers
involved in the largest schemes are mostly drawn from Dudelange itself and
have in many cases originated from within the ranks of its large landowners.
The exploratory analyses also reveal the relatively limited role of public actors
in the production of housing: in the six schemes analysed, public authorities
were insignificant landowners, constraining their ability to shape what is
produced in a context of a chronic under-supply of housing.
The case of Dudelange thus highlights the importance of private land-
owners in a country with low taxes and rapidly increasing land and house pri-
ces. In such a context, releasing land for development appears to be a complex
process that relies on social connections and which makes entrance difficult for
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investors and firms from outside the area. Local landowners at the top of the
property wealth hierarchy – who are nearly all groups of private individuals –
still own just under 400 million euros worth of residential land in Dudelange,
376 million of which are in the hands of groups among the top 105 by prop-
erty wealth. These groups will likely continue to exercise a significant degree of
control over residential development in the foreseeable future. This makes it
crucial to study in more depth the ways in which multiple property ownership
is interlinked with access to land. The Dudelange case shows that a high
degree of concentration of property wealth is not innocuous: it puts a small
group of actors in a privileged position to manage the production of housing
as a means to further family-level property wealth accumulation.
Notes
1. The Land Registry freely delivers information on the ownership of land plots to
members of the public through its online platform Geoportail. The information
analysed here is the trail of transactions that led to the current day structure of
property ownership.
2. Introduced by the law of 9 July 2004, a civil union (PACS) provides legal security in
civil, fiscal and social security matters for two people, of the same or different gender,
who have decided to live together without getting married.
3. This occurs when a property is passed through an inheritance to more than
one person.
4. These are properties for which a number of owners have agreed to share
the ownership.
5. There is uncertainty as to the exact number of apartments because not all buildings
have a detailed ‘vertical land registry’ which identifies the nature of each good.
6. This is the only information available on the size of the house. For Dudelange as a
whole, this building footprint represents a quarter of the land plot on average.
7. These articles of association are only available for domestic companies. In cases in
which a foreign company is involved in property development in Luxembourg, a local
subsidiary is usually created.
8. Groups can contain different numbers of individuals and/or companies but are
considered as one owning entity: decisions about what to do with the property are
likely made in concertation within a particular group.
9. The top 1% of these groups (71 groups) concentrated 20.6% of Dudelange’s estimated
property wealth, as compared to 17.9% for top 1% of individuals.
10. This would mean that the property developer does not own the land on which the
apartment building is built.
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